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Introduction 
The field of security governance holds a special place within the context of the debate over 
the diffusion of power from state to non-state actors, from national to international 
authorities and from governments to markets in Western democracies. Not only has the 
provision of the ‘public good’ security been considered one of the main functions of 
government, but also has it played a major role in justifying the centralization of power and 
authority within and by the nation-state (Krahmann, 2010; Leander 2006). The 
contemporary proliferation of private military and security companies, i.e. companies that 
sell armed and non-armed security services to public and private customers, poses a 
particular challenge to state-centric notions of national and global governance. Of course, 
commercial security providers are not new. Businesses have always played a role in national 
and international security, whether as mercenaries, armaments producers or logistics 
suppliers in major conflicts. The increasingly global scale of the private military and security 
industry, its functional expansion into areas previously considered to be ‘inherently 
governmental’ as well as their growing use by private individuals and business customers, 
however, suggest a significant transformation in security governance since the “golden age” 
of the Western nation-state in the mid-twentieth century (Leibfried et al., 2008; also Hogan, 
2000; Edgerton, 2006). Notably, 80 percent of their customers are individuals and 
corporations, suggesting significant private power over the provision of security. 
This chapter seeks to examine the consequences of the diffusion of security governance 
functions among military and security companies in Europe and North America. It focuses 
specifically on two problematiques identified in the introduction to this volume. The first is 
the changing scope of security governance because commercial security provision shifts the 
focus from the territory of the nation-state to subnational and international levels, and 
decision-making power from state to non-state actors. The second problematique is the 
implications of this diffusion for the norms and values underlying security governance. The 
chapter argues that it is in particular the distinct territorialities of commercial security 
provision that contribute to challenging the traditional state-centric foundations of security 
governance in Western democracies and promote the re-allocation of basic values. 
 To analyse the consequences of the growing role of military and security contractors, this 
chapter is structured into four parts. The first part outlines how the concept of territoriality 
in the ideal of the sovereign nation-state has provided the foundation for the mechanisms 
and values that defined Western security governance during the mid-twentieth century. The 
second part analyses empirically how commercial security providers are in the process of 
changing the territorial foundations of national and international security with a particular 
focus on Europe and North America. As a consequence, the chapter contends in the third 
part, the commercialization of security affects four values which have been central to the 
understanding of Western security governance in the past century: (1) the state monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force, (2) the notion that security relates to communities rather 
than individuals, (3) the rule of law and (4) the democratic control over the provision of 
security. The chapter concludes that the diffusion of power to commercial security providers 
is contributing to transforming the practical and normative foundations of national and 
global security governance. 
 
Territoriality and the State-Centric Order 
In order to analyse the implications of the commercialization of security, it is first necessary 
to understand the characteristics of the state-centric political order and the practices and 
norms which have emerged on its foundations. Territoriality has been one of the central 
concepts of this order. Territoriality has provided the framework for the notion that 
government should proceed exclusively within the physical borders of a (nation-)state and 
that citizens, their rights and obligations are defined by being born or living within these 
borders. Moreover, the concept of territorial sovereignty has led to the assertion that states 
must not interfere into the government of other states and that the government outside 
their territorial boundaries is to be decided only by states which are to be treated as 
formally equal. In sum, the state-centric order is premised on “exclusive control over 
territory, non-interference, and equality among states” (Fitzpatrick, 2002, p. 304). As these 
ideals spread slowly across Europe and North America after the signing of the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, the territorial state became a central unit of reference for a normative 
order embodied in national and international practices and law (Zacher, 2001). In practice, 
of course, the state-centric political order has always had its limitations. According to 
Stephen D. Krasner (1995/6), the territorial sovereignty of the nation-state has been 
variously compromised through conventions, contracting, coercion and imposition. 
Nevertheless, the ideal of a territorial political order based on sovereign nation-states has 
been strong, reaching its fullest expression among Western democracies during the 
twentieth century. State-centrism has shaped political practice and its underlying normative 
order.  
With regard to the provision of security, four normative values and practices have been 
particularly closely linked to the territorial state: the norm against the private use of force, 
the values of community, the rule of law and the democratic control of security. While the 
first two concern primarily the provision of security, the second two apply to the public 
control of the use of armed force. Within the order of territorial states, the norm against 
private force has taken the shape of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 
(Weber, 1994, pp. 310-311). This norm, which prohibits the private use of force in all 
circumstances but immediate self-defence, has two primary aims with regard to security. 
The first is the elimination of intentional physical violence among the members of a 
 territorially circumscribed community. The second is the avoidance of international conflict 
between individuals from different territorial communities. In both cases, the ‘natural right’ 
to employ force is deferred to the state in return for protection against internal and external 
aggressors.  
The second practice and value establishes a link between security and a territorial social 
community, represented by the ideal of the nation-state. The norm builds on the belief that 
humans are inherently social beings and that many human needs can only be satisfied 
collectively. For the provision of security it means that, while individuals can protect 
themselves through self-defence, the fear of aggression from other human beings would 
severely limit the fulfilment of many inherently social needs. The territorial nation-state 
serves to facilitate the fulfilment of these needs through two measures. One is the creation 
of territorial zones of peace in which citizens can create a social community. The second 
concerns the collectivization of resources and efforts for the protection of the community 
against external threats from beyond its territorial borders. 
The order based on the territorial state has not only provided the framework for 
contemporary norms and practices regarding the provision of security, it has also shaped 
values regarding the control of security governance. Specifically, it has been the foundation 
of two modern values: the rule of law and democracy. According to Joseph Raz (cited in 
O’Donnell, 2004, p. 35) the rule of law is defined by several characteristics: 
“1. All laws should be prospective, open and clear; 2. Laws should be relatively stable; 3. The 
making of particular laws ... must be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules; 4. The 
independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; 5. The principles of natural justice must 
be observed (i.e., open and fair hearing and absence of bias); 6. The courts should have 
review powers ... to ensure conformity with the rule of law; 7. The courts should be easily 
accessible; and 8. The discretion of crime preventing agencies should not be allowed to 
pervert the law.” 
Guillermo O’Donnell adds that “truly democratic rule of law ... ensures political rights, civil 
liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn affirm the political equality of all 
citizens and constrain the potential abuses of state power” (O’Donnell, 2004, p. 32).  
Democracy, in turn, is defined as the self-government of the citizens, coming from the Greek 
words ‘demos’ for people or citizens, and ‘kratos’ for rule. The term demos also referred to 
the ‘village’ where males enrolled for participation in ancient Athenian self-rule, giving an 
example of a territorial notion of democracy well before modern times (Blackwell, 2003). 
Territoriality plays a central role for both, contemporary rule of law and modern democracy. 
Territoriality not only sets the boundaries for the application of both values, it also ensures 
through the ideal of the democratic rule of law that the two spheres are identical. Only 
where all the citizens who are ruled by the law also have the opportunity to participate in 
defining the law can we speak of democratic self-rule. Moreover, the values of democracy 
and the rule of law are linked in that the rule of law should safeguard the self-rule of the 
citizens.  
 
The Territoriality of Commercial Security 
The proliferation of security companies directly and indirectly affects the practices, values 
and norms of Western security governance by transforming the territorial conditions for its 
provision. This section outlines the scope of the commercialization of security at two levels 
 across Europe and North America: domestic security services and international security 
governance. 
The growth of domestic security services across Europe and North America since the 1970s 
has received little public or media attention. Few citizens and politicians are aware of the 
scale to which security contractors dominate the provision of subnational security today. As 
table 1 shows the number of security contractors is nearly twice as large as that of public 
police forces in the United Kingdom (UK), Poland, the United States and Turkey, and two 
thirds the size of the state police in France and Germany. Moreover, the United States (USA), 
Poland, Germany, Turkey and Spain permit the carrying of arms by contract security guards. 
Expressly prohibited is the use of arms only in the UK and France, although the latter grants 
exceptions for transport security services. About 80 percent of commercial security services 
are directly sold to private citizens and corporations, effectively competing with the 
sovereign nation-state as the primary supplier of security within its territorial borders. 
 
Table 1. Domestic Security Providers 2007-2008 (CoESS, 2008; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2008) 
Country Public Police Security Contractors Armed Security 
Contractors 
Ratio Police/ 
Security 
Contractors 
United Kingdom 141,398 250,000 - 0.6 
Poland 100,000 165,000 No data 0.6 
United States 861,000 1,200,000 No data 0.7 
Turkey 145,000 218,660 35,263 0.7 
Germany 250,000 177,000 10,000 1.4 
France 250,000 159,000 - 1.6 
Spain 223,000 92,000 20,000 2.4 
 
Security companies also directly affect the territorial provision of security. The rise of 
commercially policed spaces in Europe and North America illustrates this development. 
Foremost is the proliferation of mass private property, including gated communities, 
shopping malls, business parks and amusement districts (Shearing and Stenning, 1983; 
Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Wilson-Doenges, 2000; Monahan, 2006; Atkinson and Blandy, 
2005). According to the Community Association Institute (2009), nearly 60 million US 
citizens, i.e. 20 percent of the total population, lived in self-governed residences in 2008, 
compared to 45 million in 2000. More than 17 million housing units in the USA are physically 
protected from their neighbourhood through gates, walls, fences and commercial security 
services (US Census Bureau, 2008, p. 66). Also in the UK, the number of gated communities 
has been increasing. In 2004, Atkinson and Flint counted “around 1,000 gated communities 
in England”, many of which were located in the wealthy Southeast (Atkinson and Flint, 2004, 
p. 879). Smaller increases in commercially secured residences have been noted in France, 
Turkey and Spain (Glasze, 2005, p. 222). 
Despite these numbers, the pervasiveness of ‘private’ security territories is often 
underestimated because gated communities are only one example of mass private 
 properties. Beyond private housing and residential areas, also corporations and public 
institutions such as hospitals and universities are increasingly hiring commercial security 
services to protect their premises. The commercial patrolling of shopping malls, university 
precincts, train stations, airports and office buildings has become so commonplace in 
Western industrialized countries that people hardly take note of it anymore. The scale of 
commercial security guarding is revealed by statistics from the UK which suggest that the 
turnover of this service segment has more than quadrupled in the past fifteen years [Figure 
1].  
 
Figure 1. British Security Industry Turnover 
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The commercial protection of formerly public spaces has contributed to the current boom of 
the sector. The most extreme case has been the ‘privatization’ of inner city districts and 
public streets in the UK and the USA. In the UK, this has taken two forms. One has been the 
outsourcing of state responsibility for the policing of streets with a high density of bars and 
clubs to these establishments. Another has been the private lease of public spaces such as 
London’s Chinatown and 42 acres in Liverpool’s city centre by commercial developers 
(Kingsnorth, 2008). In both areas citizens retain public rights of way, but security is provided 
jointly by privately employed contract security guards and the public police. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. International Security Companies1 
Company Subsidiaries, Offices and Operations Employees 
G4S (incl. ArmorGroup, 
Wackenhut, Ronco) 
Subsidiaries in 38 countries; operations in 125 countries 625,000 
Securitas Subsidiaries or operations in 49 countries 295,000 
CSC (incl. DynCorp) Offices in 35 countries and operations in more than 90 
countries 
97,000 
L-3 (incl. MPRI, Titan) Offices in 8 countries   63,000 
Guardsmark 150 offices worldwide 17,000 
CACI More than 120 offices in North America and Europe  14,300 
Control Risks 34 offices worldwide No data 
The Risk Advisory Group Offices in US, UK, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Dubai and 
operations in 100 countries 
No data 
Olive Group 11 offices worldwide and operations in 30 countries No data 
 
While the majority of security companies work within the territorial boundaries of their 
headquartered states, a growing number of firms operate internationally. Often they work 
for states and their agencies, in particular in international interventions. However, 
increasingly also non-state actors, such as transnational corporations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are employing international security companies to protect their 
operations abroad.  
The global territorial expansion of security firms occurs in two main dimensions. Firstly, a 
growing number of security companies have become transnational corporations through the 
merger with or acquisition of national security firms and the opening of offices around the 
globe. Key examples are G4S and Securitas. G4S has subsidiaries in 38 countries, provides 
security in 125 states and counts a total of 625,000 employees worldwide. Securitas has 
subsidiaries or operations in 49 countries with a total staff of about 295,000. Securitas has a 
global market share of 12 percent. Other security companies such as CSC, L-3, Guardsmark 
and CACI from the USA and Control Risks, The Risk Advisory Group and Olive from the UK 
have expanded their operations through regional or national offices in Europe, Asia, the 
Middle East and Latin America.  
Secondly, as illustrated by table 3, the use of military contractors and commercial security 
guards has increased massively in international military and humanitarian interventions as 
well as by transnational corporations operating in regions of conflict or failed states. In 2009, 
the US military alone employed 155,000 military and security contractors in Iraq, about 
25,000-30,000 of whom were armed. In addition, an estimated 48,000 commercial security 
guards worked for reconstruction firms, international organizations, NGOs and private 
businesses in Iraq. Also in Afghanistan, international military and security contractors played 
a major role in the provision of security services with 30,000 US military contractors and 
about 10,000 privately hired security staff. A comparison with previous interventions 
illustrates the growth of the commercial security sector. According to US government 
                                                 
1
 G4S (2012); Securitas (2012); CSC (2012); L-3 Communications (2011); Guardsmark (2011); CACI (2012); 
Control Risks (2012a); The Risk Advisory Group (2012); Olive Group (2012).  
 figures, “the ratio of about one contractor employee for every member of the U.S. armed 
forces in the Iraq theatre is at least 2.5 times higher than that ratio during any other major 
U.S. conflict” (CBO, 2008, p. 1). 
  
Table 3. International Interventions 
Country Soldiers (foreign) Military Support 
Contractors 
(US only) 
Security 
Contractors 
Ratio 
Soldiers/Contractors 
Iraq 152,000 155,000 48,000 0.7 
Afghanistan 53,000 30,000 10,000 1.3 
 
The services sold on the global security market cover “every aspect of security – from 
corporate operations, commercial risk and foreign investment to counter-terrorism, close 
protection and support to governments” (Aegis, 2011). In some instances international 
security companies directly replace or compete with local police and national armed forces. 
This occurs predominantly in weak or failed states where the latter are unable to maintain 
public security such as in Angola, Algeria, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
State agencies in these countries might even be seen as a cause of insecurity due to 
“endemic state corruption, personal or corporate blackmail or straight theft” against which 
international security firms have to protect their international clients (Control Risks, 2012b). 
However, also in industrialized countries international security firms are supplying armed 
guards and perimeter protection. According to these firms, international terrorism and 
organised crime affect international corporations, major banking, financial and 
manufacturing companies, governments and other multi-national organisations around the 
world. In addition to armed protection, global security firms offer terrorist damage services, 
project security management and consultancy, security design and architecture, security 
audits and reviews, supply chain security, executive protection, event security, sports event 
security management, technical surveillance countermeasures, whistleblowing services and 
forensics. 
 
Challenging State-Centric Orders 
The commercialization of security is neither new nor unwanted. In most cases, Western 
states have accepted, even promoted, the transfer of security functions to commercial 
contractors. However, the consequences of the changing practices of domestic and 
international security provision have been little examined and understood by these 
governments. This section argues that commercial security changes the territoriality of 
contemporary security governance and, thus, one of the foundations of traditional Western 
state-centric political and normative orders. The following examines four aspects of this 
order: the state monopoly on violence, political community, rule of law and democracy. 
 
 
 
 State Monopoly on Violence 
One of the most important consequences of the growth of the security industry is the 
erosion of the monopoly of the territorial state on the legitimate use of violence and with it, 
the norm against the private application of force in national and international affairs. 
Although even among Western states this monopoly has never been complete, the 
proliferation of commercial security guards and protection since the 1970s indicates a 
marked reversal of the progressive centralization of the control of armed force by Western 
states over the past three centuries (Thomson, 1994). This reversal also applies to the norm 
against mercenarism which emerged concurrently with the state monopoly on violence 
(Percy, 2007; Krahmann, 2012). The theoretical and normative implications include that the 
state is no longer the sole or even primary legitimate provider of security within its national 
territory and in international relations (Loader and Walker, 2001, p. 10). 
Within national territories in Europe and North America the expansion of the security 
industry has two major effects on the state monopoly on violence. Firstly, the availability of 
commercial security services challenges the role and ideal of the state as the supplier of 
public security (Andreas and Price, 2001, p. 35; Bislev, 2004, p. 282). Secondly, the 
proliferation of armed security guards reverses the trend towards eliminating the use of 
physical violence among the peoples living within the territorial borders of a state. Both 
aspects are inherently related in that public security or, more correctly, public peace rests on 
the prohibition of the use of armed force by private citizens. This prohibition and the 
resulting expectation of a peaceful resolution of conflicts are necessary to create a space in 
which citizens dare to engage in social exchange, including communication and trade. If all 
citizens complied with this prohibition, the state and its security agencies would be 
unnecessary. However, a small minority does not. The state monopoly on the use of violence 
to enforce public security is the logical consequence. It maintains a ban on private force and 
at the same time serves to protect citizens against single individuals who disregard this ban.  
Commercial and privately contracted security services challenge this practice with serious 
consequences for domestic security. Foremost, they create new subnational territories of 
security and insecurity. By protecting paying customers in shopping malls and gated 
communities, commercial security guards produce private zones of security, while displacing 
crime to neighbouring public spaces (Atkinson and Blandy, 2005, p. 180). Both contribute to 
undermining citizens’ expectation of non-violence and increase their fear of public areas. As 
a result in particular wealthy citizens are withdrawing from these spaces and wider social 
interaction (Monahan, 2006, p. 173). Decreased social contact with citizens from a broad 
range of cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds in turn facilitates fear of crime. British 
residents of gated communities have been observed to regard “the surrounding 
neighbourhoods as crime-prone localities, despite the fact that they had very low crime 
rates” (Atkinson and Flint, 2004, p. 879). Moreover, commercial security features such as 
gates, fences and barriers can hinder public security provision in these areas because they 
restrict police access to private territories (Atkinson and Flint, 2004, p. 882). 
In international relations, the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force has aimed to 
avoid armed conflict between individuals from different territorial communities. Instead 
citizens’ natural right to employ force is deferred to the state in return for protection against 
extra-territorial aggressors. The international monopoly of the state on the use of armed 
force has never been as successfully implemented as that within its national borders. 
However, the ideal of the territorially sovereign state and the prohibition against the 
 transnational use of military force by non-state actors has been central in global affairs. It 
has reached its fullest expression in the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the 
international laws of conflict of the twentieth century. According to the UN Charter (1945) 
states are the “original members” of the international community responsible for peace and 
security, and the Charter expressly recognizes the territorial sovereignty of its member 
states and prohibits foreign intervention within their domestic jurisdictions. Other laws 
supporting the restriction on the private use of violence in international relations have 
included the Geneva Conventions, which grant national armed forces special status and 
protection, and the UN and African Union conventions against mercenarism (Doswald-Beck, 
2007). The state monopoly on the use of armed force has thus facilitated a decline in the 
number of interstate wars since the end of the Second World War. It has also delimited 
extrastate armed conflicts, i.e. conflicts between a state and a non-state group outside its 
territory, since 1975 (Gleditsch et al., 2002, p. 624). 
The rise of a global security industry challenges the international monopoly of the state on 
the use of armed force in four ways. Firstly, commercial security providers offer alternative 
protection against external security threats. They particularly supply safeguards against the 
perceived ‘new’ threats such as international terrorism and crime. In the marketing of these 
companies public security measures need to be complemented by private, i.e. commercial, 
services because the new threats target individuals rather than national borders, thus 
overstretching state security agencies (Krahmann, 2011). The security industry even actively 
suggests that state police and national militaries are incapable of dealing effectively with the 
new types of transnational security threats. Indeed, in some cases states themselves 
encourage private citizens and businesses to hire commercial security services against these 
threats (Financial Times, 2005).  
Secondly, security firms have become central to permitting international private actors such 
as multinational corporations, NGOs and international organizations to operate in countries 
where there is a lack of public security or where state security forces are corrupt. Although 
this development has been generally viewed in a positive light, it presents another challenge 
to the state monopoly on violence which requires further consideration (Fuchs, 2007). 
Rather than relying on local governments or multinational armed forces to resolve security 
issues, international security companies have developed capabilities and expertise which 
have allowed mostly Western businesses, charities and organizations to become 
independent of state security providers. Increasing globalization and the search for scarce 
natural resources have raised the demand for such services from multinational businesses. 
One example is the private supply of security for oil and gas extracting corporations in 
Nigeria. In 2007, there were “between 1,500 and 2,000 private security companies (PSCs) 
operating in Nigeria, employing in excess of 100,000 people” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 
2007). Major international security firms in Nigeria include G4S’s Outsourcing Services Ltd., 
Control Risks and ArmorGroup. Another example is the use of security firms by NGOs. While 
many NGOs are reluctant to admit to hiring commercial security guards, empirical evidence 
of the growing reliance of NGOs on contracted security guards is mounting (Spearin, 2001; 
Spearin, 2008; Cockayne, 2006). The intermeshing of security and development has been 
one factor that has led NGOs to take more ‘proactive’ stances towards the provision of aid in 
conflict regions. Security firms use the moral dilemmas of NGOs to promote their services. 
As Control Risks (2012c) writes: “Combating the increasing risks faced by aid workers across 
the globe is a difficult balancing act:  too much overt security and aid workers risk being 
 associated with armed forces, too little and an organisation's duty of care can be 
questioned.” 
Thirdly, global security firms such as the now defunct Executive Outcomes and Sandline 
International have supplied international help in internal conflicts (Howe, 1998; Aning, 2001; 
Francis, 1999). In 1995, for instance, the Sierra Leonean government hired Executive 
Outcomes for $35 million to support its poorly trained national armed forces in the conflict 
with the Revolutionary United Front (Francis, 1999; Cleaver 2000). The company’s initial 
success, however, was short lived. Only five months later, the military of Sierra Leone 
aligned itself with the revolutionaries and overthrew the government. To regain power the 
ousted government brought in Sandline International which (in addition to ECOMOG troops) 
facilitated its return to power in February 1998. 
Fourthly, international security companies support state police and armed forces in 
international interventions. While contractors have always reinforced national militaries in 
major interstate wars, the post-Cold War era has seen the emergence of military contracting 
for international peacekeeping and peacemaking missions (CBO, 2008, p. 13). In fact, some 
companies such as Blackwater have claimed that they would be able to supply peacekeeping 
troops for an international intervention in Darfur if the international community could agree 
on hiring them (Washington Times, 2006). As table 3 has indicated, however, so far the 
largest demand comes from states participating in multinational military operations which 
are not sustainable in terms of scope and duration without the support of security 
contractors. 
 
Community 
The commercialization, privatization and deterritorialization of security also affect the value, 
norm and system of national and international security communities. Specifically, the market 
in security services contrasts the provision of security from a collective good supplied to a 
community of citizens living within a national territory with a notion of security as an 
individual and exclusive property. Whereas the state-centric territorial order led to the 
predominant conception of security as related to the protection of national borders and 
everybody living within them, the commercialization of security has gone hand in hand with 
normative and practical shifts towards individual security. Mostly, this turn from national 
borders and military security concerns towards the survival of individuals and groups has 
been perceived as progressive. However, it has also some negative implications (McDonald, 
2002; Paris, 2001). In particular, an individualized conception and provision of security 
threatens the norm of security as a collective good as well as the coherence and 
perpetuation of existing security communities at the national and international levels.  
In domestic affairs, the commercialization of security contributes to the erosion of the norm 
of a national security community embodied in the territorial nation-state through three 
major developments. Firstly, the marketization of security leads to the creation of 
subnational ‘security communities’ based not on citizenship, but on the ability to pay for 
commercial security services. Gated communities are the direct illustration of these new 
types of ‘security communities’. Commercially protected corporate spaces, shopping malls 
and entertainment centres create different kinds of security communities where financial 
prowess determines membership. Private corporations not only obtain contract security for 
their assets, but also for their employees. Entry to shopping malls and entertainment parks 
 depends upon the ability of citizens to act as consumers within commercially secured ‘public’ 
private spaces. What differentiates private security communities from those of the state are 
the lack of social and political cohesion and the absence of a collective sense of identity and 
mutual responsibility. Declining notions of community are characteristic of gated 
communities where residents of high-income communities have a significantly lower sense 
of community than non-gated housing precincts (Wilson-Doenges, 2000, p. 605). Gated 
communities are also perceived as a “process of exclusion and distinction” by the residents 
of neighbouring housing areas (Atkinson and Flint, 2004, p. 883). Security firms exacerbate 
the division between these private security communities and non-members by being 
responsible exclusively to their clients (Joh, 2004, p. 90). In short, the commercialization of 
security contributes to eroding the norms, values and practices that link between territorial 
citizenship, national community and security, and replaces it with commercial status and 
transactions. 
Secondly, the commercialization of security not only leads to the formation of new ‘private’ 
security communities, but also to the individualization of security. One development 
questioning the concept and practice of security communities is the assertion that security 
risks are individual rather than collective. Security firms contribute to this development 
through marketing strategies that emphasize personal and corporate differences with 
regards to the exposure and vulnerability to particular security threats. According to these 
marketing strategies contemporary security threats are not collective, but personal, 
requiring “bespoke Security Service tailored to your individual needs and requirements” 
which only commercial security contractors can supply (Golden Crown Security, 2012). In 
fact, the assertion that clients’ security needs are distinct is one of the most widely-found 
statements on security firms’ websites (Allander Security, 2012; Britsafe Security, 2012; 
Danhouse Security, 2012; Elite Protection, 2012). With the conception that security is related 
to individuals rather than communities comes the responsibilization of consumers with 
regard to their personal or corporate safety. Security companies present this responsibility 
often as an issue of personal or corporate governance and duty of care (Octaga Security 
Services, 2012). According to Control Risks (2012d), “Expecting the unexpected has become 
a corporate responsibility”. Even Western states seem to imply an increased responsibility of 
citizens and corporations to protect themselves (O’Malley, 2006, p. 49; Mythen and 
Walklate, 2006, p. 134). 
Thirdly, by suggesting that security is best provided at the individual or corporate level, the 
commercialization of security encourages a declining commitment of citizens to personally 
participate in or finance collective public security measures. This development has been 
most extensive in the USA where “issues of secession and tax withdrawal become a 
problem” due to the rise of gated communities and mass private properties (Webster et al., 
2002, p. 317). But also in Europe an emerging disconnect between security and the national 
territorial community can be observed in trends such as the growing demand for commercial 
security services and the dissatisfaction with public police despite decreasing crime rates. 
In international affairs, the impact of the global security industry on national and 
international security communities can be noted in two main contexts. One has been the 
impact of international security firms on national security communities. In terms of social 
and political cohesion, collective identity and mutual responsibility, the greatest effect of 
international commercial security provision has been on developing and failed states. In 
these countries, security firms have allowed multinational corporations, international 
 organizations, local businesses and wealthy individuals to obtain their own security 
independently from the national community, often exacerbating the weakness of public 
security agencies and community relations. The territoriality of this practice is illustrated by 
privately secured and fenced corporate enclaves in Africa, gated residential communities in 
Latin America and the ‘green zones’ of Iraq and Haiti (Avant, 2005; Henry and Higate, 2009). 
In these examples, security firms create nearly autonomous areas within the host countries, 
often alienating the wider population (Ferguson, 2005, p. 378). The visible separation 
between the commercially protected and those living in neighbouring areas contributes to 
the formation of different ‘security communities’ within these national territories. As James 
Ferguson (2005, p. 379) describes, the “enclaves of mineral-extractive investment on the 
[African] continent are normally tightly integrated with the head offices of multinational 
corporations and metropolitan centers, but sharply walled off from their own national 
societies (often literally walled, with bricks and razor wire)”. 
Another development facilitated by the availability of commercial security and military 
services has been the weakening of international security communities. In International 
Relations Theory, the concept of international security communities refers to a “region of 
states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and 
Barnett, 1998, p. 30). It represents the fullest application of the state-centric political order 
which rests on the recognition of the territorial sovereignty of all member countries. 
Nevertheless, there have been few examples where the expectation of peaceful conflict 
resolution among groups of states has achieved the same prevalence as within national 
borders. Foremost among them have been NATO and the European Union where the sense 
of community necessary for the functioning of an international security community has been 
reinforced by common interpretations of external threats, a high density of social 
interactions and a collective identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 38). While the defining 
feature of international security communities is their internal relations, at a maximum they 
also view and address external threats as common security concerns. In the North Atlantic 
Treaty (1949), the ideal of mutual responsibility for protection from external threats is 
institutionalized in Article 5 which proscribes “that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”. Despite 
the persistence and even growth of NATO, the past decades have witnessed a weakening 
sense of community among its members illustrated by diverse threat interpretations and a 
preference for ‘coalitions of the willing’ for the implementation of international security 
policies. The security industry has reinforced these trends through its discourse of 
individualized security risks and the supply of non-state security forces for international 
interventions. The former has contributed to a shift in the threat perception of the 
transatlantic security community away from the common threat of the Warsaw Pact to a 
multitude of ‘new’ security concerns such as terrorism, crime, proliferation, immigration and 
economic instability. Although most of these transnational threats can only be effectively 
addressed through collective efforts, the impression of many governments that their 
national territories are exposed to these threats to varying degrees has facilitated different 
national attitudes and approaches. In addition, the non-existential nature of the ‘new’ 
security concerns has implied that contemporary military interventions are ‘wars of choice’. 
The latter has permitted Western governments to act unilaterally when there is no 
agreement over the need for international military operations by supplementing their forces 
with military contractors.  
 The recent war in Iraq has been the primary example of this trend. Already at the outset 
there was a significant disagreement among the members of the transatlantic security 
community regarding the nature and level of the threat from Iraq. Later the USA and the UK 
led the intervention by a ‘coalition of the willing’ without a UN mandate. Since major 
members of the transatlantic community such as France and Germany refused to become 
engaged in the war, the coalition forces hired about 160,000 security and military 
contractors to support their mission (CBO, 2008, p. 1; Hansard, 2008, Col. 1552W). The 
refusal of the US government as occupying state to accept full responsibility for public 
security after the war, but to leave it to security companies added another twist to the Iraq 
case. If it becomes a precedent, it suggests a further change to the state-centric territorial 
order by reliving intervening states of their international role in the provision of public 
security (Sassoli, 2005, 663). Its effect on the national and international sense of community 
became apparent in the aftermath as Iraqis increasingly viewed the coalition forces not as 
liberators, but as hostile powers.  
 
Rule of Law 
A third area affected by the distinct territorialities of commercial security has been the 
norm, value and practice of the rule of law. Within the state-centric order, territoriality has 
played a major role in the definition and implementation of the rule of law because it 
delineates: (1) who has the right to create the law, (2) who is subject to the law, (3) who 
enforces the law, and (4) to whom the law and its enforcers are accountable. At the centre 
of these four dimensions has been the norm of territorial sovereignty. It regards the creation 
and application of modern law within the territorial borders of the state and concerns the 
formation of international law focused on inter-state relations (Brown cited in Fitzpatrick, 
2002, p. 308). In addition, this order ascribes to the state the right and responsibility for the 
enforcement of the rule of law within its territory and for the implementation of 
international law. As with the provision of security, the ideal-typical territorial state holds 
the monopoly on the legitimate use of force with regards to the implementation of the rule 
of law. Thus, Fitzpatrick (2002, p. 311-12) writes: “The use of force in law enforcement is one 
of the exclusive powers of the post-Westphalian state”. In international relations, the 
monopoly on the use of armed force with regards to international law is a major factor in 
the international provision and maintenance of security. It is expressed through the special 
status attributed to the state and national armed forces in the UN Charta and the Geneva 
Conventions and includes “an obligation to prevent territory from becoming a staging area 
for armed attacks on other states” (Fitzpatrick, 2002, p. 311). In sum, the rule of law goes 
beyond the mere creation of a rule-governed national and international order (O’Donnell, 
2004, p. 32). Modern rule of law is inherently related to the concepts of community and 
democracy, requiring the involvement of citizens in the definition of laws, the opportunity 
for redress, and the public accountability and control of the agencies charged with the 
implementation of the rule of law (Raz cited in O’Donnell, 2004, p. 35). 
The commercialization of security challenges the definition, application, implementation, 
and democratic accountability and control of the rule of law in multiple ways. At the 
domestic level, contracted security contributes to the creation of private spaces where 
separate sets of rules apply in addition to public law. Gated communities have been 
described as “a form of semiprivate government”, where residential associations or 
developers proscribe how members may behave and who is permitted to enter its 
 commercially policed spaces (Kennedy, 1995, p. 763). Notable about these private territories 
is the limited involvement of residents in the definition of communal regulations. Citizens 
are “the relatively powerless partner” in a gated community because they often only have 
the option of deciding whether or not to rent or buy a property which requires of them to 
sign up to regulations already set by the developers or residential associations (Webster et 
al., 2002, pp. 317; also Atkinson and Blandy, 2005, p. 177-8). Frequently, these regulations 
are “incomprehensible and non-negotiable” (MacKenzie cited in Atkinson and Blandy, 2005, 
p. 183). They can include the “banning as a threat to community order such things as 
basketball hoops over garages, heavy dogs, cats of any weight, too many poodles or 
smooching grandparents” (Kennedy, 1995, p. 762-3). The private rules set within these 
precincts also affect non-members, ranging from restrictions to freedom of speech and 
movement to racial discrimination (Kennedy, 1995, p. 761). The autonomous rule setting in 
private territories violates contemporary democratic principles in three areas. Firstly, it 
disregards the principle of equality because “in many countries the voting rights in 
condominiums and corporations are distributed according to the value of the property” 
(Glasze, 2005, p. 228). Secondly, in private residential or semi-public corporate territories, 
there is no formal opposition or critical media reporting on decisions. Thirdly, in shopping 
malls, corporate estates or private residences investors often hold the majority of or control 
over the property, being able to determine the rules and management of these (semi)private 
spaces in line with their profit-maximizing objectives.  Often there are no ways for non-
members to seek redress within the system of private community association regulations.  
In addition, the growing role of security companies in their enforcement presents another 
challenge to the ideal of territorial sovereignty. Private systems of law “may provide a wide 
range of discretion to security personnel, resulting in discriminatory enforcement of the 
associations regulations” (Kennedy, 1995, p. 769). Also the implementation of public law by 
security firms undermines the monopoly of the state on the legitimate use of violence for 
the execution of the rule of law. The employees of these firms “behave like public law 
enforcement officers: detaining individuals, conducting searches, investigating crimes, and 
maintaining order” (Joh, 2004, p. 50). Little research has been conducted about the abuse of 
force by the employees of security firms operating in Western democracies (Kirby, 2008, p. 
84). Joh (2004, p. 59, 62) suggests that the tendency of commercial security guards to avoid 
obvious coercive means in their rule or law enforcement stems from their distinct objectives. 
State police forces are mostly concerned with arrests in order to hold citizens accountable 
for breaches of the rule of law. Contracted security guards are primarily employed in order 
to protect their clients from security threats or losses due to theft. As a result, the police 
operate “largely reactive”, while security firms engage in preventative practices (Joh, 2004, 
p. 59). The greater legal rights of commercial security forces as the agents of the owners of 
private properties and enclaves facilitate the use of proactive security strategies. Contrary to 
public police, commercial security guards may bar or eject “those considered undesirable or 
unwelcome from the malls, corporate campuses, and other private spaces that are policed 
privately” (Joh, 2004, p. 65). This power to exclude citizens which are, rightly or not, 
perceived as potential security threats from the benefits of these private territories acts 
undermines the central notions of the rule of law that everybody is treated equally and 
considered not guilty until convicted. 
Finally, despite the growing contribution of security firms to the enforcement of the rule of 
law, the firms and the actions of their employees are typically not subject to the same 
 standards of legal and constitutional accountability and control as public security forces. 
National laws requiring the licensing of domestic security companies in Europe and North 
America are often not more than a decade old (CoESS, 2008; de Waard, 1999). The UK 
government, for instance, favoured self-regulation for many years and only adopted a law 
on the security industry in 2001. Also in the USA there are still a number of states which lack 
licensing regimes for security firms such as Mississippi, Alabama and Colorado. Other US 
state licensing laws require “little more than asking applicants to promise that they are 
qualified to be a security guard” (Maahs and Hemmens cited in Joh, 2004, p. 108). Since the 
requirements for vetting, training and equipment vary considerably, security firms have the 
option of evading strict standards by registering in the states and countries with the least 
controls (Stenning, 2000, p. 338). While there has been a tightening of licensing laws in 
recent years, there are still two major omissions across most Western democracies. One 
regards the regulation of in-house security personnel, i.e. those who are directly employed 
by a corporation or shopping mall rather than by a security firm. The other concerns the 
behaviour of contracted security personnel (Joh, 2004, p. 107). The latter is particularly 
notable in comparison with the public police who are subject to constitutional or legal 
controls with regards to the detention, arrest and use of force against citizens (Joh, 2004, p. 
60). In the case of private territories, the Western rule of law still assumes that the owner is 
‘king of his castle’ and that citizens who enter them have to accept private rules and their 
private enforcement. That both the rules and the commercial security forces are only 
accountable to and controlled by the owners disregards the spread of mass private 
properties as working, shopping and spare time environments in Europe and North America. 
The proliferation of transnational military and security firms has similar fundamental 
consequences for the state-centric territorial conception of the rule of law in international 
relations. Foremost, the increasingly global make-up and operation of these companies 
transforms the territorial foundations of the regulation of the use of armed force in 
international law. As Fitzpatrick (2002, p. 317) argues  
“The legal definitions of international armed conflict are constructed against the background 
of the post-Westphalian system. Thus, Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
envisions international armed conflict between High Contracting Parties. Only territorial 
states are capable of ratifying the Geneva Conventions. The complex rules that govern 
international armed conflict .... thus control behaviour among states.”  
The conceptualization, creation and the application of the contemporary international laws 
of armed conflict are all based on the territorial sovereignty of the state (Dinstein, 2004). 
They assume that armed conflict primarily occurs between states; proscribe that only states 
can agree on the definition of the international laws of war; and are mostly applicable to 
states and their agents. These international laws of armed conflict are complemented by 
several conventions such as the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (1977), 
the UN Conventions Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries (1989) and the Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenaries in Africa (1977) which seek to ensure that states remain the only legitimate 
wielders of collective violence in international relations (Kassebaum, 2000; Zarate, 1998). 
Arguably, the state-centric territorial conception of the international rule of law has 
experienced some modification in recent years, including an increasingly homocentric 
approach as indicated by the terminological shift from the ‘laws of armed conflict’ to 
‘international humanitarian law’ (Meron, 2006, p. 2). Nevertheless, states remain the 
 primary addressee of the international laws of armed conflict. Individuals can only be held 
directly responsible for a very limited set of grave breaches against international criminal 
law, such as genocide and crimes against humanity (Weigelt and Märker, 2007, p. 378). 
Moreover, there has not been a venue outside the territorial jurisdiction of states in which 
international criminal laws could be enforced until the formation of the International 
Criminal Court in 2002. In the case of the international laws of armed conflict, it remains 
until today the obligation of states to prevent or prosecute violations (Weigelt and Märker, 
2007, p. 379). 
The contemporary global security industry evades and undermines the international rule of 
law on the use of armed force in two main respects. Firstly, security companies are neither 
states nor are they always ‘accompanying the armed forces’, a special category that was 
introduced in the Geneva Conventions in 1949. As a result large parts of international law 
are not applicable to these firms, although they often use armed force in local conflicts and 
to protect their private clients. In Iraq, for instance, it has been reported that the 
“Employees of security companies… frequently come under fire from insurgents. When they 
do, they fire back” (Priest and Flaherty, 2004). Imke-Ilse Drews (2007, p. 339) concludes that 
the Blackwater contractors who defended the CPA headquarters in Najaf in April 2004 could 
even be tried as mercenaries under the Geneva Conventions because they were fighting in 
what was then still an ‘international conflict’ or ‘alien occupation’. Many military and 
security contractors would fit the definition of mercenaries outlined in Article 47 of the First 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions and used in the UN and AU conventions 
against mercenarism. However, the cumulative nature of the definition, the difficulty of 
proving the profit motivation of a security contractor and the unwillingness of states to 
enforce these conventions have so far prevented prosecution. Many Western states have 
instead become complicit in the circumvention of the international laws of conflict by 
accepting international security companies as legitimate and legal actors (Lehnardt, 2007, p. 
140). The US government has officially endorsed the use of “deadly force” by US security 
contractors “when such force reasonably appears necessary to execute their security 
mission to protect assets/persons, consistent with the terms and conditions contained in 
their contract or with their job description” (DoD, 2010). Other states such as the UK have 
tolerated international security companies which export armed services from their 
territories.  
Secondly, the international operation and organization of international security firms and 
the diverse nationalities of their employees hinders the enforcement of the international 
laws of armed conflict. Foremost is the problem of jurisdictional responsibility within an 
order based on territorial sovereignty. While states are formally responsible for the 
implementation of international humanitarian law, in practice it is often unclear which state 
has the right and duty to prosecute security contractors for violations. When security firms 
work directly for states and their agencies, the responsibility appears to rest with the 
employing country (Lehnardt, 2007). When security firms are hired by private citizens, 
businesses or organizations, as is increasingly the case, the question becomes more difficult 
to answer (Gillard, 2008). Does prosecution fall to the state where the violation took place? 
Is it the responsibility of the state where the security company employing the perpetrator is 
registered? Or is it a case for the state where the offender is a national citizen? Western 
governments have so far shown little willingness or interest to accept their responsibility for 
the implementation of international law, leaving the problem to countries where 
 international security firms are operating. Unfortunately these countries are typically those 
which lack effective and efficient law enforcement agencies - one reason why global security 
contractors are working there in the first place. Efforts to address these issues through 
national and international regulations on the export of commercial security services have 
been limited. Only the US and South Africa have national licensing regimes for the global 
operation of international security companies (Caparini, 2008). States have also rejected 
recent attempts to forge new international laws with regards to international security firms. 
The Montreux Document (2008) which is supported by 38 countries, including Afghanistan, 
Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Ukraine, and the USA, has instead reinforced existing 
international laws of armed conflict and human rights laws. 
 
Democracy 
Finally, the rise of the security industry is challenging the norms, values and practices of 
modern democracy in Europe and North America. Democracy, according to Arthur Benz and 
Yannis Papadopoulos (2006, p. 5), is “characterized by structures and processes in which 
collectively binding decisions are made by responsive actors in the interest of those citizens 
who authorized them to rule in their place. Thus the democratic legitimacy of a polity and of 
particular policies requires a circular relationship between decision-makers and the 
citizenry”. Territoriality has played two major roles in the definition of Western democracy. 
Firstly, it has defined the scope of the polity or citizenry. Secondly, it has set the boundaries 
for the application and implementation of collectively binding decisions (Hettne, 2000, p. 
35). Importantly, the territorial correspondence between both areas provides that “[e]very 
person affected by a collective decision should have the opportunity to express his or her 
will” (Benz and Papadopoulos, 2006, p. 6).   
The commercialization of security at the domestic and international levels has important 
consequences for democratic security policy making. It affects particularly the definition of 
security threats and strategies and the accountability of security providers. The first regards 
a transformation of who is involved in the definition of security threats and strategies, who 
is the primary object of security and the processes by which decisions concerning the 
provision of security are taken (Krahmann, 2008; Leander, 2005). The state-centric ideal of 
democracy envisages the democratic deliberation and public and parliamentary scrutiny of 
public security policies by elected representatives of the total citizenry based on an 
examination of potential security threats to the community. By contrast, security companies 
and their clients decide unilaterally upon which kinds of security services they consider 
appropriate for the protection of individual customers and their private properties. Even the 
commercial security supplied to new collectives such as gated residences is characterized by 
a lack democratic decision-making. Against the notion that housing associations represent a 
classic form of democratic self-government, stand inequalities in voting rights based on 
property value and the “dictatorial” practices of investment firms owning entire residences 
(Glasze, 2005, p. 228). Effectively, “the political organisation in private neighbourhoods is 
returning to the days of a census suffrage where political influence was institutionally based 
on status and class” (Glasze, 2005, pp. 228-9). 
In addition, commercial security providers are exclusively accountable to their clients. The 
typical security firm is “only interested in the directions, approval, and guidance of its 
 employer” (Joh, 2004, p. 90). However, with the rise of mass private property and the 
displacement of crime to neighbouring areas, a growing number of citizens not involved in 
this decision-making process are directly affected by its consequences. As Atkinson and 
Blandy (2005, p. 179) conclude, “Gated communities express a broader trend of private 
decision-making that has wider and public ramifications. In short, the locational choices 
made by affluent households affect outcomes for the poor in terms of city sustainability, 
security and social segregation.” In place of collective and democratic control, security 
decision-making becomes increasingly fragmented and privatized. Loader (1999, p. 384) goes 
even further, arguing that   
“The security market thus offers – and may appeal as – an ‘institutionalized exit from politics’ 
(Bauman 1988: 82), an escape from the ‘democratic’ requirements that attend the struggle 
for a share of public policing. In enables individuals, organisations and communities to pursue 
their particularistic (and self-defined) security requirements without reference to any 
conception of the common good, and free of the obligations associated with the practice of 
democratic citizenship.” 
The emergence of commercially secured mass private properties not only questions the 
state-centric model of democracy at the domestic level, the global security industry also can 
contribute to its destabilization at the international level. The effect of international security 
firms on the democratic provision of security can be observed in three dimensions. Firstly, 
international security companies can challenge the democratic control of security by 
national governments through the supply of security services for actors within. Arguably, this 
is particularly controversial when their clients are large and influential or when their services 
have a direct impact on the security of non-customers. However, the deficit of democratic 
control over the commercial provision of security can be observed independently of the 
question of whether or not this lack has negative consequences for public security. Within 
the EU, for instance, the mutual recognition of national licences of security firms indubitably 
restricts the ability of national parliaments to control the ways in which contract security 
guards may operate within their sovereign territories. Similarly, the absence of import and 
export restrictions on commercial security services in most countries around the world has 
created an area where private, albeit not always armed, force can be employed beyond the 
democratic control which characterizes state agencies such as national police and armed 
forces. 
Secondly, international military and security companies can support non-democratic factions 
in internal conflicts, government-business collusion and coups d’état and hinder democratic 
development (McIntyre and Weiss, 2007). Executive Outcomes and Sandline International 
were widely criticized for their linkages with extractive corporations through major holding 
companies. This included allegations that these companies were reimbursed by the weak 
and poor governments by whom they had been hired through the granting of licences to 
foreign oil and mining corporations (Fuchs, 2007). Also the failure of security companies to 
instil democratic values into national armed forces which they had been training in military 
operations and strategy has been noted in cases such as Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone 
and MPRI in Croatia (Avant, 2005, pp. 100-113; Singer, 2003, pp. 113-4, 126-7). Finally, 
leading mercenaries such as the infamous Simon Mann, one of the founders of Sandline 
International, have been involved in the coups d’état attempt in Equatorial Guinea in 2004. 
Although the target in this case was not a democratic government, the interests of the 
private investors who backed Mann were clearly not the promotion of democracy, but 
rather the exploitation of the country’s oil resources. 
 Thirdly, global security firms can further weaken the democratic accountability of 
international interventions. One aspect is the use of security contractors by international 
organizations and NGOs such as UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, UNICEP and ICRC in humanitarian 
missions (Ebo, 2008, p. 146). The private protection supplied by security firms has 
increasingly allowed non-state actors to operate in conflict regions where these actors have 
previously depended on security support from national or multinational armed forces 
(Spearin, 2001; Spearin, 2008). Moreover, some companies such as Blackwater have 
proposed that international security firms could complement or even substitute for national 
militaries in international peacekeeping and peacemaking operations (Robertson, 2008). The 
proponents of this approach argue that it can help make international interventions 
independent of the vagaries of the democratic decision-making process which has led to the 
“shameful withdrawal of Western nations from peacekeeping activities in conflicts of limited 
national interest” (Brooks and Chorey, 2008, p. 117). Another aspect concerns the 
circumvention of public and parliamentary approval for the deployment of national armed 
forces in military interventions abroad (Wulf, 2008, pp. 199-200). The availability of military 
and security contractors to bolster their armed forces has been one factor which has allowed 
the UK and the US governments to ignore public opposition to the war in Iraq despite one of 
the “biggest anti-war demonstration ever held in Britain and worldwide” (MacAskill and 
White, 2003). More importantly, the hiring of military and security companies can 
undermine the democratic control of governments through the requirement of 
parliamentary consent for the deployment of soldiers abroad. The 155,000 contractors 
employed by the US armed forces allowed the Bush administration to more than double the 
personnel for its military operation in Iraq without having to ask Congress for the approval of 
additional troops (Avant, 2000, pp. 1-2; Avant and Sigelman, 2010). The lack of public and 
parliamentary information about the numbers and functions of contractors hired by 
Western militaries in international interventions exacerbates the problem of democratic 
control. Only the USA has so far attempted to address this problem through the creation of a 
database in 2006, while the UK government was still in the process of setting up a similar file 
in 2008 (GAO, 2006, pp. 14-20; GAO, 2007, p. 11).  
 
Conclusion 
The proliferation of security and military companies not only contributes to a diffusion of 
functions and powers from national governments to international and non-state actors, but 
also has profound implications for the territorial foundations of the norms, values and 
practices that have shaped Western security governance during the past century. Many 
other factors also contribute to the transformation of the “golden age” nation-state, the 
international state-centric order and its underlying values. On the ideological side has been 
the rise of Neoliberalism with its promotion of new forms of public service provision and 
public accountability. On the practical side have been the perceived demands of the post-
Cold War security environment, technological changes and globalization. This chapter has 
sought to illustrate that military and security companies have not merely been beneficiaries 
of these changes. They have contributed to and reinforced them through their own 
discourses and practices. 
This chapter has identified four areas which the diffusion of power to military and security 
companies suggests the rise of alternative norms, values and forms of security governance in 
Europe and North America. The first regards a transformation of the norm of the state 
 monopoly on violence illustrated by the increasing functions and acceptance of security 
contractors. The second is the diffusion of security governance from national to private 
‘security communities’ and from collective to individual values. The third includes the ways 
in which security contractors challenge state-centric forms of law which regulate the use of 
armed force nationally and internationally and the emergence of security industry self-
regulation. The fourth includes a public disillusionment with the normative ideal of 
democracy and a turn towards individualized and marketized forms of decision-making. 
Arguably these alternatives have not replaced the norms, values and practices of security 
governance centred on territorial states. Instead, they have created a system where state 
and non-state forms of security governance exist in parallel or even in hybrid systems, each 
creating their own rationalities and concerns.  
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